The Lanham Act (1946) introduced collective and certification marks to US law. So doing, it has generally been regarded as innovative and forward looking. Yet collective and certification marks had been widely used individual states since the previous century and international conventions had long been pushing the federal government to protect them. Indeed, it may be stranger that the US trademark law of 1905 did not include protection for such marks than that, forty years later, the Lanham Act did. In exploring why the law of 1905 failed to respond to innovation all around it and why the Lanham Act was celebrated for fulfilling such long-overdue obligations, this article questions conventionally linear accounts of the development of trademark law and practice.
No relevant law was enacted. The subject came up again in Brussels. Here France introduced a rather sharp resolution calling on the United States to bring federal law into line with its treaty obligations. The US delegates pleaded their problems with federal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the delegates reported that "the desirability of the protection of marks indicating collections of individuals was universally conceded." And the conference passed a resolution expressing "the desire that collective marks shall be protected in the same manner as individual marks in the countries of the union."
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Duguid, Case if Prejudice?
and Peter Grosscup. Greeley was formerly the Assistant Commissioner of Patents in the US Patent Office. Like Forbes, Greeley had written on international comparative law.
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Grosscup was a US District Court judge. Before 1898, he appears to have sat on only two trademark cases, though intriguingly in 1898, as if to catch up, he sat on three. 27 As we shall see, Grosscup's judicial expertise lay elsewhere.
McKinley's commission failed to agree. Forbes and Grosscup issued a majority report, and Greeley a minority one. Both reports proposed justifying new law under the "commerce clause" of the Constitution, thus overcoming the Supreme Court's objections. The majority also proposed a fairly extensive revision of trademark law, while Greeley stayed as close as possible to the law of 1881, and thus to common law. Despite being a minority report, it was primarily Greeley's proposal that was enacted in 1905. 28 Both the majority and minority reports acknowledged the pressure to toe the international line and suggested that their proposals would. Greeley, in particular noted that his "satisfied ... the present needs of our trademark interests." Writing in anticipation of the law, Greeley had argued that one "important" feature of the coming act was "the inclusion of associations." This might suggest that he believed the law would protect collective marks. But in a longer exegesis published after the act was passed, Greeley remarkably makes no mention of this "important" aspect of the law. 29 The section on definitions and clarifications in the 1905 law did note that "'person' and 'owner,' and any other word or term used to designate the applicant . . . include[s] a firm, corporation, or association" without further comment. 30 But no-one seems to have assumed that "association" covered owners of collective or certification marks. Thus, where the Internal pressure
Finally, then, 46 years into the new century, the Lanham Act acknowledged international obligations stemming from the old. But the pressure for change was not only international. Strong pressure had been exerted within the country and to a significant degree from unions, whose rights were finally acknowledged in Title X of Lanham.
Early US collective and certification marks
Before 1905, collective and certification marks in the United States were represented primarily--though not solely--by the "union label." This survives today, if at all, in the minuscule printers' "bug" at the edges of union-printed documents, in memories of International Ladies Garment Workers' marks, or on eBay. Yet at their height, more than 60 US unions deployed labels and most states recognized them. 37 In 1900, the Cigar Makers' International Union (CMIU) gave out more than one billion and spent over $30 million on "label agitation." No private mark that was so widespread or well supported. As Justice Holmes observed at the time, the label "was of far more economic importance to the union than are many or most of the trade-marks strictly so called."
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That unions might have a significant role in the history of trademarks is not surprising. Unions are successors to guilds and guilds were historical repositories of early kinds of marking. 39 That the United States, with a historically ambivalent view of union activity, should be the prime site of union marks, rather than, for example, the UK (where they were tried) may seem odd. unions. For them the boycott was as, if not more, important than the strike, and the label was particularly effective in boycotts. 40 Moreover, the confrontations in which the label was used were distinct. The UK unions engaged in classic confrontations between labor and employers. In the United States, alliances between the two were more common. Cooperation was essential for the label: a union had to agree to have its label used while employers had to agree to associate it with their goods or services. Firms like the clothing maker Carhartt and the drinks maker Horlicks, among many others, willingly applied a union label to their product as a way to advertise cooperative relationships with their employees. 41 With the same goal in view but less cooperative relations, others faked or forged the label. The label was a particularly US development, moreover, because the first fight in which it was deployed was a particularly US fight. From the 1860s a wave of potent anti-Chinese tribalism united many Americans across other racial boundaries as well as across the division between employee and employer. "No single factor," a contemporary commentator, put it, was "so powerful" in the label's genesis.
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The "gold rush" was the earliest major draw for Chinese immigrants; the Central Pacific Railroad the next. Construction work on the railroad ended in 1869 and the laidoff Chinese moved to the cities, particularly San Francisco. With few resources, they sought, as workers, relatively low-skill businesses, and as fledgling entrepreneurs, lowcapital ones. Cigar and shoe making thus offered themselves as arenas for antiimmigrant tension, involving both employees and small employers. 43 Chinese labor was both far from the only union concern and far from a concern of unions only. American inveighed against "the tenement horror" that employed "women, girls, and small children" in "working a fourteen hour daily average." Cigars made in tenements became a particular concern. "I have visited these pest holes personally," Theodore Roosevelt reported, "and I can assure you if smokers could only see how these cigars are made we should not need any legislative action against this system." From here it is only a short step to the Chinese and insinuations of the sort made by one (anti-union) contemporary, "A smoker may prefer his cigar very full-flavoured, but his taste in this respect is not likely to be sufficiently strong to lead him to appreciate an aroma the outcome of dirt and squalid... an element of danger in smoking Chinese-made cigars." By similar processes of elision, the Chinese soon provided ready scapegoats for all labor's ills. "Ah, the Chinese cigar-makers," a character in Frank Norris's McTeague exclaims, "It's them as is ruining the cause of white labor." 44 Amidst such sentiments both unions and manufacturers developed "white labor" labels. While the manufacturers' marks were conventional, if reprehensible, the union's initiated collective and certification marking.
Trademark registrations
One union historian sees the genesis of such union labels in a carpenter's stamp used in 1869 to distinguish union-made lumber during a fight for an eight-hour day. 45 The next manifestation is usually thought to be a label of the California cigarmakers. 46 If, however, we look at trademark registrations, the story is a little more complex. In California, which began trademark registration in 1863, the first union-like mark registered is for "The United Workingmen's Cooperative Boots and Shoes" in 1873. The mark itself indicates no particular cause. 47 Another mark that year is also significant. The CMAPC label was given to authorized manufacturers to certify the cigars were union made. Thus we might trace the seeds of US collective and certification marks to a cooperative with a neutral label, a private company with an implicitly racist label, and an unaffiliated union, who imitated the first two and offered its label to approved employers to certify the source of their goods, fulfilling criteria that would be recognized in Lanham 70 years later.
The two distinct ideas behind the label--union certification and anti-Chinese racism--spread at times together and at times a part. A St Louis local of the Cigar Makers' International Union (CMIU) took up the idea of certification to persuade firms to pay union rates. It registered a red label to endorse union-made goods (without a hint of xenophobia) in 1879. 50 After endorsement by the international union's convention in Chicago in 1880, both white and red labels were used to oppose outsourcing in New number or page number in the register.) The Cooperative had, however, formed in opposition to attempts to "substitute cheap Chinese labor for the dearer white labor." Charles Howard Shinn, York. The CMIU label made the Chinese (or "coolies") only one among various anathemas in its claim that the cigars it marked had been made by cigarmakers "opposed to inferior rat shop, coolie, prison, or filthy tenement-house workmanship." This label was distributed in 1881 and apparently received with enthusiasm.
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California registrations show that unions were not alone adopting racist marks. In 1878, John Shaeffer, once a union member but by 1878 a cigar manufacturer and in 1884 president of the manufacturers association, registered a "white labor" label. Numerous other manufacturers soon followed. 52 These marks probably reflect the success of earlier labels and a need to avoid any taint implied by the absence of "white labor" certification. As these trademarks spread, they became more aggressive. In 1882, the Boot and Shoemakers' White Labor League tried to register a label that showed a white hand around the throat of a pigtailed head. The California Secretary of State voided this label (a rare occurrence), probably as an affront to public decency. 53 Cigar manufacturers were not so restrained. As racial tensions in the business grew, Adolph Stone registered pictures of a woman on horseback slaying multiple dragons with the copy "abajo los Chinos," "anti monopoly," and "white labor." 54 These images seem to have set the tone for the Cigar Makers' International Union (CMIU), whose San Francisco local (228) registered its version of the national label in 1886. This omitted mention of "coolies" but used the phrase "white labor" beside a muscled hand plunging a dagger into a snarling dragon. The other aspect of the union label--the idea of collective certification marks--also spread quickly, travelling well beyond unions and beyond racism. By the middle of the 1880s, viniculturalists and fruit growers had registered collective marks, as had the Trades Assembly Hall, the Board of Pork Packers, the Farmers Union, and the Butcher's Protective Union.
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To understand where such collective enthusiasm met its limits, it helps to turn from state to federal trademarks and look at US trademark registers. In the first decade of federal registrations, several shoe-and cigar-making unions registered marks, as did members of the growing cooperative movement. Then, in 1879, the Patent Office rejected an application by the CMAPC, the independent California cigarmakers' union, on two grounds. On the one hand, it ruled that "it does not appear that the members of this association all manufacture the same goods" but only that "those who employ [the label] are members of a certain association." On the other hand, the Patent Office ruled that the label's "avowed object is to discourage the Chinese from manufacturing cigars" which the registrar saw as a "restraint of trade ... opposed to public policy." 57 Consequently, while in California the marks of unions and other associations continued to be registered, in the federal register they are harder to find. Some union and cooperative marks do appear in the federal register after 1879, but it is not always clear whether this involved lack of attention on the part of the registrar or subterfuge on behalf of the union. 
Weighing the results
Trademark law often appears "chaotic" and trademark judges' decisions capricious.
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Registration can be no less confusing. Though banned by ex parte CMAPC and attributed to the Lanham Act, various kinds of collective and certification marks do appear in the federal register from the 1870s. These suggest that union actions did push US innovation in this regard. But, we might ask, was the union label anything more than an obscure sideshow in the history of trademarks, something it would be easy for the President's commission of 1898 to overlook? One way to explore the label's influence is to examine the extent to which it was taken up. Here evidence comes primarily from union records and press. Such partial evidence can be weighed more dispassionately from a second line of enquiry: exploring the extent to which the label was imitated and more directly forged. These trends take us from the trade press into the courts, contemporary testing ground not only for the influence, but also for the validity of these kinds of collective and certification marks. This exploration, first of influence and then of legitimacy, will look primarily, though not exclusively, at the cigarmakers. As they had taken the lead in the development of the union label, so they also took the lead in its initial defence.
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Within two years of launching its label, the CMIU had issued 8 million and 50 firms were cooperating with the union to use them. The annual total rose to 31 million by 1888 and, as noted above, 1 billion by the end of the century. 61 Meanwhile, between 1870 and 1890, the proportion of Chinese in cigar production in California, dropped from almost 90 percent to 72.5. 62 Similarly, the hatters claimed 13 million labels issued comply with the Paris Convention, which the United States had signed the year before.
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Schechter, Historical Foundations, 153.
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As racism remained endemic in their label campaigns, however, they are not necessarily the best representatives of more general trends in label content. As unlabelled goods could be deprecated as the product of "coolie," prison, or child labor, labelled goods commanded a premium. 65 Thus, inevitably, imitation labels appeared. As noted above, private "white labor" labels preceded and accompanied union registrations in California. But a remarkable range of infringers, from small producers (including the Chinese) to the tobacco trusts, flattered the CMIU with passable imitations; others simply stole or forged union labels and stuck them on nonunion cigars. 66 As a judge in one case noted, such behavior "demonstrated the label is at all events worth stealing." 67 With billions, both genuine and imitation, in circulation, it would be hard to argue that by 1900 such labels were unknown to a commission investigating trademarks.
The cigarmakers claimed to have "never missed an opportunity to take infringement cases to court." Courts, however, did not always respond favorably. The tussles were widely reported. In 1889, the New York Times commented that many 
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"judges agree ... [union] labels are defective in nearly every requisite of a legal trade mark." In fact, lack of agreement is more evident, best summed up in a trademark manual which noted how in some cases the union label's "right ... as a trade mark has been denied, while in others the right is affirmed"; among these cases the author was "unable to find a consistent pattern." Another commentary noted tactfully that "courts have not always been in entire accord" while a judge looking over preceding decisions could make little of the "divergent propositions" they put forth. Overall, case law suggests a slow movement from unpredictability to increasing scepticism in a series of high-profile cases.
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Initially, courts were affronted by the brazen imitators. The first sign that such sentiment was shifting came in 1887 when a lower-court decision in the cigarmakers' favor prevailed only because the Minnesota Supreme Court split evenly over the right of an association to own a mark. The following year a group of New York manufacturers, the union believed, deliberately provoked a suit hoping a favourable judgement would overthrow the union's right. (This alone might indicate the efficacy of the label.) The court ruled, however, that the union member had as "valuable interest in the good will of his labor" as the manufacturer had an interest "in the good will of his trade."
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The same year, nonetheless, the union met its first major defeat. In the eyes of some jurists, such decisions were Canute like in their attempts to restrain both law and practice. Times, they argued, had changed and common law judgements should too. Some criticized the McVey decision for its logic, others criticized its detachment from the realities of a marketplace where "certain manufacturers had trademarks placed on goods by their order" in a similar process of certification. 72 In this vein, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the union mark is a kind of "certificate of good workmanship" and that such marks of certification were neither unknown nor objectionable. 73 A similar view had already been accepted in the nonunion, federal case of Menendez v. Holt [1885, 1888] , where the lower court ruled that Holt & Co had the right to register the mark "La Favorita" to certify flour manufactured by others but selected by Holt. The US Supreme Court accepted that such marks were equivalent to a "certificate that the flour was genuine" and reflected "skill, judgment, and expert knowledge, and add[ed] value and reputation ... when made by those in whom purchasers have confidence." 74 As, at this times, numerous importers and stores (including Bloomingdale, Lord & Taylor, Macy, Sears, and Wanamaker) let alone retail cigar dealers who sold the output from tenement houses were registering marks to put on goods that they did not make, it took a certain determination to rule against such marks. Most of this resistance arose when it was an association not a corporation doing the certifying, that is when the matter involved a collective as well as a certification mark, but even this, it was noted at the time, took a certain stubbornness. As one judge wrote:
I cannot see why ... an association whose members are engaged in the same trade ... may not adopt a label ... it shows that it was made by a member of the union ... laws, as more evidence of the prevalence of collective and certification marks in the nineteenth century, that we now turn.
Litigation to legislation
With the courts uncertain, unions changed strategy from litigation to legislation. They first sought laws to prevent the grievances against which the label campaigned. Here they continued to beleaguer the Chinese, lending their help to legislators over the various "Exclusion Acts" of the 1880s and 1890s. But they also fought to outlaw tenement, child, and prison labor (or, at a minimum, require prison-made goods be branded as such).
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Success in such campaigns made unions aware of their power in state legislatures, which they increasingly pressured to support the label. In 1887, California passed a law explicitly permitting a "trade union, labor association, or labor organization ...
[to] adopt and use a trademark." 81 By 1890, some 20 states had similar laws and the 1900 report of the Industrial Commission on Labor Legislation noted that "nearly all the States have now adopted a statute" allowing such labels. 82 Most of these laws mentioned unions specifically; some came closer to general collective-mark legislation, with as in Lanham unions only one among many associations allowed to register marks and pursue injunctions without necessarily meeting the standards for common law or equity courts.
Rather, then, rather than assert their ability to meet such standards--which would have opened federal as well as state courts to them--the unions negotiated a right to be heard in state courts. This right expanded the scope of marking in ways that long anticipated Lanham, but it left the question of federal law on collective marks unresolved. In 1890, the Knights of Labor, the Hatters, and the Cigarmakers all petitioned Congress for federal law, but to no effect. Seven years later Sydney Mudd, a Maryland also Hattan, Labor Visions. Consequently, when the major push for federal trademark reform pulled congress and administration together in the effort that led ultimately to the law of 1905, it seems fair to say, from any reading of the international pressure discussed in the previous section or of the national pressure discussed in this, that it would have been hard to avoid the interest in collective and certification marks. Yet, to repeat, nothing happened. To understand the absence of action is rarely easy. The historian is faced, as in this case, with the awkward world of conjecture and counterfactuals. The best I can hope to offer is context for conjecture.
Context for conjecture
When the unions initially developed their collective and certification marks, many of the causes they fought enjoyed, as we have seen, both popular support and the cooperation of employers. 84 A writer in American Federationist wrote of the label, "As a preventative of strikes and lockouts, and a preserver of friendly relations between the manufacturer and those employed, no other agency has, as yet, manifested so potent an influence."
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This was both a little over sanguine and, in 1897, a little late. By the time the President's commission convened the following year, "friendly relations" were turning hostile.
Where once firms had unionised to gain access to the label, firms now publicly refused to have anything to do with it. 86 By the time the law of 1905 was under discussion, the president of Harvard was arguing apocalyptically that "the union label will never give us peace with liberty, never." , and Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor and former leader of the CMIU. Calling for federal troops to be used against railway strikers and introducing terms like "insurrection," "conspiracy," and "illegal combination" into his judgements, Grosscup helped open the way for the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to be invoked against unions for using the label. 88 Gompers and Grosscup, moreover, exchanged antagonistic letters that quickly became public. 89 The depth of Grosscup's antipathy might best be measured from a piece he wrote more than 20 years later, in which his utter distaste for Gompers, unions, and collective action, all of which Grosscup associated with "Sovietism" and "irresponsible radical leadership... trying to undermine the concept of law and order," endures. 90 Gompers was vicepresident of the cigarmakers' union, when the President's commission was formed, and as the cigarmakers' union was the dominant force behind the early union label, Grosscup's appointment was, at best, unlikely to favor union interests and likely to oppose anything they supported, even if others supported it too.
The commission's failure to address union labels directly and to call no union witnesses (though one, as noted, had a billion collective marks in circulation) is remarkable. 91 But there is no need to lay responsibility on one figure. Had the commission ruled in favor of collective and commercial labels and the international obligations they represented, suitable law would have faced a difficult passage through In this period, too, ideas about intellectual property were changing. As Catherine Fisk has shown, courts increasingly rejected workers' rights to intellectual property. In this vein, the defence in one union label case argued that union members were not "manufacturers of cigars, but merely laborers employed to convert the material provided into the article of trade" (though, as James Duke acknowledged, his employees "knew more about manufacturing tobacco than the man that owned the business and sold it").
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This was the case in which the lower court in this case had held that the "laborer has the same valuable interest in the good will of his labor as the manufacturer has in the good will of his trade."
96 But Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet denied anything accrued to making per se--arguing that the journeymen were "skilled workmen and nothing more." Ownership in a mark for Van Fleet had nothing to do with labor or good will, but with a "vendible commodity" and that belonged to the manufacturer or retailer. 97 Once again, it
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The commission also "took into consideration the views expressed by the American Bar Association, For Westbury the property test turns not on the "vendible commodity" but on the mark, and the right to such a mark vests in the person whose labor is at issue. Westbury's labor theory of property argues in a tradition extending back at least to Locke. Van Fleet, in contrast, reflects the late-nineteenth-century shift away from such a view of property towards one in which work for hire implicitly surrendered any claims in labor or rights of ownership to the person hiring. In England, Communists and Chartists had been fighting (and losing) fights over rights in labor for many years, and Marx had argued that under capitalism, in return for a subsistence wage laborers surrendered "noble reproductive power." In Van Fleet's view, they also surrendered the right to "denote the result of their own labour" in a label.
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Courts that rejected unions' rights to use an emblem or mark to certify their collective labor rejected the Lockean tradition of labor and value and pushed into the new territory of the marginalists. Paradoxically they simultaneously claimed for themselves a traditionalist's position, invoking common law and rejecting "new" practices of collective and certification marking, even when these were not union related. Hence, by ignoring tradition in labor, they managed also to ignore innovation in marks. In the end, the fight towards collective and certification marks within the United States, then, might best be understood as a struggle between the international development of collective and Paradoxically, the need for innovation provides the best justification for that enclosure.
In the case of trademarks, however, in order to deny ownership to employees, enclosure specifically turned its back on innovation.
Conclusion
By the end of the nineteenth century, business practice in the area of trademarks was changing. Firms, cooperatives, and associations, both within the United States and outside were using collective, certification, and service marks. Courts and legislatures struggled to keep up. As countries passed relevant law, they pushed their trading partners through treaties and conventions to stay abreast. And as some of the several states passed relevant law, that too directly and indirectly put pressure on the US federal government. And yet, when in the midst of all this the US government had the opportunity to revise its law, it acted as if there were no issue to address. It remains hard to understand why, but as this paper has sought to show, one plausible reason is that collective and certification marks were, in the United States, primarily the product of unions and when the law was rewritten in 1905 anti-unionism was growing. Innovation from that direction was not admissible.
Not only did nothing happen in 1905, but when US law finally caught up in 1946, 50 years of US obfuscation and fudges around treaties and commitments were forgotten. Commentators celebrated the Lanham Act as if it were an unprecedented stride into the future rather than a tacit apology to for the past. In the acknowledged absence of hard evidence, this paper has attempted to suggest that the omissions of 1905 were the result of prejudice. Not the racial prejudice of the early California labels, but prejudice against the unions themselves and the innovative rights of certification they were trying to claim. What then of the purblindness of 1946 and after when Lanham has been proclaimed as innovative and forward looking and assimilated into evolutionary accounts of trademark law and practice? The reason historians overlook the omissions of 1905 and celebrate the innovation of Lanham may be much the same as the reason those omissions occurred. A while ago, Philip Scranton suggested that business history tends to find the labor process uninteresting.
101 By extension, business, legal, and marketing history can seem unaware of the possibility of innovation by organized labor. Thus, the goal of this article is not necessarily to extol the unions. Indeed, to tell this tale has required revisiting some thoroughly unpleasant aspects of union history. But the history of trademarks and brands, which has flourished in recent years, has been primarily Whiggish, celebrating the achievements of big brands, forward-looking entrepreneurs, and canny marketing men. It has also looked to new laws as determinants of innovative change. Such work is unquestionably important. Occasionally, however, it may be turning a blind eye to history--though turning it not, as in Nelson's paradigmatic case, to the signal for retreat, but rather to signs of progress. 
